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HP HPE6-A78（Aruba Certified Network Security Associate）試験は、ネットワークセキュリティの概念と技術に関する知識と理解度を試験するHPによって実施される認定試験です。ネットワークセキュリティの専門家の需要がますます高まる中、この試験を受けることで、個人は就職市場で際立つために必要な競争力を提供してくれます。

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HP Aruba Certified Network Security Associate Exam 認定 HPE6-A78 試験問題 (Q129-Q134):

質問 # 129
A client has accessed an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com using Chrome. The server sends a certificate that includes these properties:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
Extended Key Usage (EKU): Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_Signing
The server also sends an intermediate CA certificate for MyCA_Signing, which is signed by MyCA. The client's Trusted CA Certificate list does not include the MyCA or MyCA_Signing certificates.
Which factor or factors prevent the client from trusting the certificate?

A. The certificate lacks a valid SAN.
B. The certificate lacks the correct EKU.
C. The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.
D. The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates.

正解：C

解説：
This question is identical to Question 17, with the same certificate properties and scenario. The client (Chrome browser) accesses an HTTPS server at myhost1.example.com, and the server presents a certificate with:
Subject name: myhost.example.com
SAN: DNS: myhost.example.com; DNS: myhost1.example.com
EKU: Server authentication
Issuer: MyCA_Signing (intermediate CA)
The intermediate CA certificate (MyCA_Signing) is signed by MyCA (root CA).
The client's Trusted CA Certificate list does not include MyCA or MyCA_Signing.
The certificate validation process is the same as in Question 17:
Name Validation: The SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which matches the server's hostname, so this passes.
EKU Validation: The EKU is "Server authentication," which is correct for HTTPS, so this passes.
Chain of Trust Validation: The client attempts to build a chain from the server's certificate to a trusted root CA:
Server certificate → MyCA_Signing → MyCA Since MyCA is not in the client's Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain cannot be validated, and the client does not trust the certificate.
Option A, "The client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is correct. The absence of MyCA in the client's trust store prevents the client from validating the certificate chain.
Option B, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN," is incorrect because the SAN includes "myhost1.example.com," which is valid.
Option C, "The certificate lacks the correct EKU," is incorrect because the EKU is correctly set to "Server authentication." Option D, "The certificate lacks a valid SAN, and the client does not have the correct trusted CA certificates," is incorrect because the SAN is valid; the only issue is the missing trusted CA certificates.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide states:
"For a client to trust a server's certificate during HTTPS communication, the client must validate the certificate chain to a trusted root CA in its trust store. If the root CA (e.g., MyCA) or intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) is not in the client's Trusted CA Certificate list, the chain of trust cannot be established, and the client will reject the certificate. The Subject Alternative Name (SAN) must include the server's hostname, and the Extended Key Usage (EKU) must include 'Server authentication' for HTTPS." (Page 205, Certificate Validation Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide notes:
"A common reason for certificate validation failure is the absence of the root CA certificate in the client's trust store. For example, if a server's certificate is issued by an intermediate CA (e.g., MyCA_Signing) that chains to a root CA (e.g., MyCA), the client must have the root CA certificate in its Trusted CA Certificate list to trust the chain." (Page 45, Certificate Trust Issues Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-CX 10.12 Security Guide, Certificate Validation Section, Page 205.
HPE Aruba Networking Security Fundamentals Guide, Certificate Trust Issues Section, Page 45.

質問 # 130
What is a benefit of Protected Management Frames (PMF). sometimes called Management Frame Protection (MFP)?

A. PMF ensures trial traffic between APs and Mobility Controllers (MCs) is encrypted.
B. PMF protects clients from DoS attacks based on forged de-authentication frames
C. PMF prevents hackers from capturing the traffic between APs and Mobility Controllers.
D. PMF helps to protect APs and MCs from unauthorized management access by hackers.

正解：B

解説：
Protected Management Frames (PMF), also known as Management Frame Protection (MFP), is designed to protect clients from denial-of-service (DoS) attacks that involve forged de-authentication and disassociation frames. These attacks can disconnect legitimate clients from the network. PMF provides a way to authenticate these management frames, ensuring that they are not forged, thus enhancing the security of the wireless network.
:
IEEE 802.11w amendment, which introduces PMF as a security enhancement to protect management frames.
Wi-Fi Alliance security guidelines for Protected Management Frames (PMF).

質問 # 131
Which correctly describes one of HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager's (CPPM's) device profiling methods?

A. CPPM can use Wireshark to actively probe devices, analyze their traffic patterns, and construct an endpoint profile.
B. CPPM can analyze settings such as TTL and time window size in endpoints' TCP traffic in order to fingerprint the OS.
C. CPPM can use SNMP to configure Aruba switches and mobility devices to mirror client traffic to CPPM for analysis.
D. CPPM can analyze settings such as TCP/UDP ports used for HTTP, DHCP, and DNS in endpoints' traffic to fingerprint the OS.

正解：B

解説：
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) uses device profiling to identify and classify endpoints on the network, enabling granular access control based on device type, OS, or other attributes. CPPM supports both passive and active profiling methods.
Option C, "CPPM can analyze settings such as TTL and time window size in endpoints' TCP traffic in order to fingerprint the OS," is correct. TCP fingerprinting is a passive profiling method used by CPPM. It involves analyzing TCP packet headers, such as the Time To Live (TTL) value and TCP window size, which vary between operating systems (e.g., Windows, Linux, macOS). CPPM captures this traffic (e.g., via mirrored traffic from a switch or controller) and matches the TCP attributes against its fingerprint database to identify the OS of the endpoint.
Option A, "CPPM can use Wireshark to actively probe devices, analyze their traffic patterns, and construct an endpoint profile," is incorrect. CPPM does not use Wireshark for profiling; Wireshark is a third-party packet analysis tool. CPPM has its own built-in profiling engine and does not rely on external tools like Wireshark for active probing.
Option B, "CPPM can use SNMP to configure Aruba switches and mobility devices to mirror client traffic to CPPM for analysis," is incorrect. While CPPM can receive mirrored traffic for profiling (e.g., via SPAN or mirror ports), it does not use SNMP to configure the mirroring. The configuration of traffic mirroring is typically done manually on the switch or controller (e.g., using a datapath mirror on an MC), not via SNMP by CPPM.
Option D, "CPPM can analyze settings such as TCP/UDP ports used for HTTP, DHCP, and DNS in endpoints' traffic to fingerprint the OS," is incorrect. While CPPM does analyze HTTP, DHCP, and DNS traffic for profiling, it does not fingerprint the OS based on TCP/UDP ports. Instead, it uses attributes like DHCP Option 55 (for DHCP fingerprinting) or HTTP User-Agent strings (for HTTP fingerprinting) to identify devices, not the ports themselves.
The HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide states:
"ClearPass supports TCP fingerprinting as a passive profiling method to identify the operating system of endpoints. By analyzing TCP packet headers, such as the Time To Live (TTL) value and TCP window size, ClearPass can fingerprint the OS of a device. For example, Windows devices typically have a TTL of 128, while Linux devices often have a TTL of 64. These attributes are matched against ClearPass's fingerprint database to classify the device." (Page 248, TCP Fingerprinting Section) Additionally, the ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet notes:
"ClearPass uses passive profiling techniques like TCP fingerprinting to identify device operating systems. By examining TCP attributes such as TTL and window size, ClearPass can accurately determine whether a device is running Windows, Linux, macOS, or another OS, enabling precise policy enforcement." (Page 3, Profiling Methods Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking ClearPass Policy Manager 6.11 User Guide, TCP Fingerprinting Section, Page 248.
ClearPass Device Insight Data Sheet, Profiling Methods Section, Page 3.

質問 # 132
Your AOS solution has detected a rogue AP with Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP). Which information about the detected radio can best help you to locate the rogue device?

A. The match type
B. The match method
C. The confidence level
D. The detecting devices

正解：D

解説：
In an HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 solution, the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system is used to detect and classify rogue Access Points (APs). When a rogue AP is detected, the AOS system provides various pieces of information about the detected radio, such as the SSID, BSSID, match method, match type, confidence level, and the devices that detected the rogue AP. The goal is to locate the physical rogue device, which requires identifying its approximate location in the network environment.
Option A, "The detecting devices," is correct. The "detecting devices" refer to the authorized APs or radios that detected the rogue AP's signal. This information is critical for locating the rogue device because it provides the physical locations of the detecting APs. By knowing which APs detected the rogue AP and their signal strength (RSSI) readings, you can triangulate the approximate location of the rogue AP. For example, if AP-1 in Building A and AP-2 in Building B both detect the rogue AP, and AP-1 reports a stronger signal, the rogue AP is likely closer to AP-1 in Building A.
Option B, "The match method," is incorrect. The match method (e.g., "Plus one," "Eth-Wired-Mac-Table") indicates how the rogue AP was classified (e.g., based on a BSSID close to a known MAC or its presence on the wired network). While this helps understand why the AP was classified as rogue, it does not directly help locate the physical device.
Option C, "The confidence level," is incorrect. The confidence level indicates the likelihood that the AP is correctly classified as rogue (e.g., 90% confidence). This is useful for assessing the reliability of the classification but does not provide location information.
Option D, "The match type," is incorrect. The match type (e.g., "Rogue," "Suspected Rogue") specifies the category of the classification. Like the match method, it helps understand the classification but does not aid in physically locating the device.
The HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide states:
"When a rogue AP is detected by the Wireless Intrusion Prevention (WIP) system, the 'detecting devices' information lists the authorized APs or radios that detected the rogue AP's signal. This is the most useful information for locating the rogue device, as it provides the physical locations of the detecting APs. By analyzing the signal strength (RSSI) reported by each detecting device, you can triangulate the approximate location of the rogue AP. For example, if AP-1 and AP-2 detect the rogue AP, and AP-1 reports a higher RSSI, the rogue AP is likely closer to AP-1." (Page 416, Rogue AP Detection Section) Additionally, the HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide notes:
"To locate a rogue AP, use the 'detecting devices' information in the AOS Detected Radios page. This lists the APs that detected the rogue AP, along with signal strength data, enabling triangulation to pinpoint the rogue device's location." (Page 80, Locating Rogue APs Section)
:
HPE Aruba Networking AOS-8 8.11 User Guide, Rogue AP Detection Section, Page 416.
HPE Aruba Networking Security Guide, Locating Rogue APs Section, Page 80.

質問 # 133
From which solution can ClearPass Policy Manager (CPPM) receive detailed information about client device type OS and status?

A. ClearPass Onboard
B. ClearPass OnGuard
C. ClearPass Guest
D. ClearPass Access Tracker

正解：B

質問 # 134
......

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